Debris from the Ukraine International Airlines crash in Iran, January 9, 2020. (AFP)

April 24, 2021

Compelling evidence has surfaced that now suggests the shooting down of Ukrainian Flight 752 by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in January 2020 was in no way an error but a premeditated intentional act, reported the King Weekly Sentinel.

Since day one of the crash, Andre Milne with Unicorn Aerospace has been investigating and his evidence is now being used by the Ukrainian Anti-Terrorist prosecutor to determine if there are grounds to take Iran to the World Court for Crimes Against Humanity for shooting down PS752.

Milne calls it a “premeditated” SAM attack on civilian Flight PS752 after takeoff outside Tehran.

The reason? To subvert an inevitable US military counterstrike against Iran by the creation of a spontaneous “human shield” made up of dozens of foreign government officials who all started flying into Iran five hours after the initial IRGC short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) attack on US and Canadian forces in Iraq.

After reading through the final report from the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board of Iran, Milne discovered evidence that the IRGC deployed Electronic Warfare Jamming Technology in coordination with the TOR M1 Air Defense Unit that fired the two missiles that destroyed PS752.

“The IRGC simultaneously blacked out the broadcast frequencies of PS752’s Satellite GPS Navigation and Emergency Locator Transmitters and continued to jam until the IRGC was able to get to the crash site and physically disable the ELT that started broadcasting signals to the World’s Emergency Satellite Network the second the first missile struck PS752,” Milne said.

Milne has submitted his latest finding direct to the Ukrainian Minister of Justice citing the cockpit voice recording transcripts of both pilots of PS752 becoming alarmed about the loss of GPS navigation immediately “before” they were struck by the IRGC’s first missile.

“As the IRGC have years of experience in coordination of Electronic Warfare Technology when jamming the GPS on ships in the Gulf as part of their organized piracy operations, it is disturbing yet not surprising the IRGC used GPS and Satellite jammers against PS752 during their coordination planning in attacking PS752,” Milne pointed out.

He said four separate flights departing the same airport entered into the 25-kilometer radar detection the perimeter of the missile battery. All civilian airliners transmit transponder signals to identify themselves and Milne noted no fewer than 168 signals were transmitted, detected and identified during this time.

Flight PS752 entered this same perimeter and broadcasted at least 18 signals, and “all would have been detected and identified as all having originated from a civilian airliner” by the Iranian TOR M1 ADU.

Further, he said the Iranians noted that a “ghost detection radar signal” was identified as heading from the southwest towards the IRGC TOR M1 ADU that was deemed as a threat.

Simultaneously, the IRGC claimed the actual PS752 that Milne identifies as ghost 2 was not detected and or tracked as approaching the TOR M1 ADU, and yet the real flight was still targeted and struck with two missiles. This took place all while the same TOR M1 ADU was allegedly trying to track and target the first ghost threat 23 kilometers away in an entirely different direction.

In his findings, Milne pointed out the TOR M1 missile system has two separate radar systems, one for detection and one for targeting.

Asharq Al-Awsat

About Track Persia

Track PersiaTrack Persia is a Platform run by dedicated analysts who spend much of their time researching the Middle East, in due process we fall upon many indications of growing expansionary ambitions on the part of Iran in the MENA region and the wider Islamic world. These ambitions commonly increase tensions and undermine stability.